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Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Petitioner Hercules Incorporated ("Hercules") hereby 
submits this Reply Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Statement of the Case contained in Hercules' initial brief 
and in Salt Lake County's (the "County") brief is reasonably 
accurate. However, Hercules believes the County's purported 
clarification of Hercules' Statement of Facts needs correction. 
CORRECTION OF THE COUNTY'S CLARIFICATION 
OF HERCULES' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Paragraph 1 of the County's clarification of Hercules' 
Statement of Facts states: "The County would note that the Bacchus 
works is responsible for 83% of the business of the Aerospace 
group." County brief at p. 5. This assertion is inaccurate and 
misleading. The Bacchus Works constitutes 83% of the physical 
assets of the Aerospace group, not 83% of the business of the 
Aerospace group. Transcript, ("Tr.") pp. 98-99. The record does 
not indicate what portion of the Bacchus Works assets are located 
in Davis County at Hercules' Clearfield, Utah facility, or what 
portion of the Bacchus works is located in Tooele County at 
Hercules' Tekoi Test Range.1 Furthermore, the 83% of physical 
assets number does not show, in any way, the Bacchus Works' 
1
 Hercules' Bacchus Works consists of Bacchus West, Plant 1, NIROP and 
Plant 3 all located in Salt Lake County, and Plant 2 located in Davis County at 
Clearfield, Utah as well as Tekoi Test Range which is in Tooele County. 
Tr. pp. 159-160. 
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relative contribution to earnings of the Aerospace Group as 
compared to those Hercules' Aerospace facilities which are located 
in other states, or counties in Utah other than Salt Lake County. 
2. In paragraph 3 of the County's Clarification of Hercules' 
Statement of Facts the County states: "However, the testimony of 
David R. Peirson, Hercules' manager of state and local taxes, 
indicated that, as of the lien date, prospects for business growth 
were good." County brief at p. 6. The transcript citation, 
Tr. 108-09, which the County relies upon to support this assertion 
shows only that Hercules' prospects for production of the Titan 
rocket motor may have been good as of January 1, 1990. The record 
does not support any assertion, or implication, for production at 
the Bacchus works of other rocket motors. Thus, although Titan 
production may have "looked pretty good," other rocket motor 
production at the Bacchus works didn't look very good at all. 
3. In paragraph 4 of the County's Clarification of Hercules' 
Statement of Facts, the County states: "On cross-examination, 
however, Mr. Peirson acknowledged that the loss might be 
recoverable." County brief at p. 7. This is misleading because 
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Mr. Peirson later testified that "Hercules never did recover these 
losses." Tr. pp. 162-63.2 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN REQUIRING HERCULES TO 
REBUT THE APPRAISED VALUE ASSIGNED BY EDDIE 
KENT. 
The County asserts that the Commission was correct in 
requiring Hercules to prove that Mr. Kent's appraised value of $183 
million was not the proper assessed value. The County states: 
After Hercules called the value of its 
property for assessment purposes into 
question, the County reevaluated its use of 
this historical method, determining it to be 
incorrect and modified its original value, 
which resulted in a decrease of approximately 
$28 million. . . . 
Far from being discarded as an "unofficial 
assessment", the County's assessment, modified 
to take depreciation into consideration 
(including an economic obsolescence factor), 
is entitled to a presumption of correctness, 
the taxpayer (Hercules) having failed to 
provide a sound evidentiary basis to support 
its assertion of a lower valuation. County 
brief at pp. 11 & 12. 
Q: What about the losses in the annual report listed for 1989, 
have they been recovered? 
A: No they have not. 
Q: What happened? 
A: They haven't been recovered. The contracts haven't been 
completed, the Titan test firing was a failure. Even if we 
complete the Titan contract, even if we complete this test 
firing, the next firing of the Titan motor, we have four more 
to test successfully. 
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As pointed out in Hercules' initial brief, Mr. Kent's 
appraisal was not the County's official assessment which is 
entitled to any presumption of correctness, Mr. Kent's appraisal 
was not incorporated into the County Assessment book for delivery 
to the County Auditor by the County Assessor, under affidavit. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-311. The County Auditor did not transmit 
this $183 million proposed value on the assessment books to the 
Commission. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-322. In other words, 
Mr. Kent's appraised value had no presumptive validity. 
Furthermore, this appraised value was arrived at only in 
preparation for the hearing before the Utah State Tax Commission. 
Mr. Kent's appraisal was not even completed until September 10, 
1991, more than nine (9) months after Hercules had already paid its 
taxes to the County based upon an assessed value of approximately 
$211 million.3 Record, Exhibit R-4. 
The original $211 million assessment was the value the County 
asserted in the hearing before the Board of Equalization, Record 
Exhibit P-31, and was also asserted throughout all proceedings 
before the Utah State Tax Commission. This can be seen by 
examining the Motion for Directed Verdict brought by the County's 
attorney following the close of Hercules' case at the Commission 
hearing, Tr. pp. 690-700; and by reviewing the post-hearing 
3
 Taxes were due and paid by Hercules to Salt Lake County on 
November 30, 1990 for the lien date of January 1, 1990. See Utah Code Ann. §59-
2-1331. 
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memorandum filed by the County with the Commission; Record pp. 68-
113. 
Mr. Kent's appraisal is not an "adjustment," as urged by the 
County. It was an entirely new value prepared using a different 
appraisal methodology, solely for the Commission hearing, and was 
clear evidence that the County could not sustain a fair market 
value of $211 million as it asserted before the Board of 
Equalization. Mr. Kent's appraisal opinion of a $183 million value 
is not entitled to any presumption and the Commission erred when it 
required Hercules to demonstrate that this value was improper. In 
this proceeding the burden of proof was not Hercules1 . Once the 
Commission rejected the County's assessment of approximately $211 
million, both parties bore an equal burden and that party which 
established value by a preponderance of the evidence should have 
prevailed. That party was Hercules. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION ERRED BY FAILING TO PROPERLY 
ACCOUNT FOR THE ECONOMIC AND FUNCTIONAL 
OBSOLESCENCE OF HERCULES' FACILITIES. 
A. Economic Obsolescence. 
Mr. Kent assigned a 10% economic obsolescence factor to 
Hercules' facilities. As pointed out in Hercules' initial brief, 
Mr. Shoup aggregated economic obsolescence, functional obsolescence 
and physical deterioration in order to arrive at an accumulated 
depreciation figure for Hercules' facilities. Hercules then 
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confirmed Mr. Shoup's assignment of accumulated depreciation by 
performing two utilization studies showing that Hercules' 
facilities were significantly under-employed as of January 1, 1990. 
See report by Richard Cloward, Record, Exhibit P-19, and report by 
Dr. Crawford, Record, Exhibit P-28. Hercules also presented 
substantial evidence to indicate why it suffered such massive and 
significant economic obsolescence. 
Mr. Kent could not articulate any qualitative or quantitative 
analysis as to how he assigned his 10% economic obsolescence 
factor. His testimony was that the 10% figure was based upon 
"appraisal judgment." Tr. p. 1002. In other words, Mr. Kent's 
assignment was completely arbitrary. 
Even though both parties identified the same external factors 
which caused Hercules' property to suffer from economic obsoles-
cence, i.e. treaties, reduction and cancellation of missile 
contracts, the space shuttle disaster, the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
general peace efforts, etc., Mr. Kent gave no evidence, and could 
not articulate the way in which he determined that a 10% economic 
obsolescence factor should be applied to Hercules' facilities. Tr. 
p. 985. His determination was based solely upon appraisal 
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judgment. Tr. p. 868, 985 and 1002.4 The record shows that 
Mr. Kent has no experience in valuing the kind of industrial 
facility represented by Hercules' Bacchus works, i.e. in excess of 
2 million square feet. 
Hercules, in contrast, identified the factors which caused 
economic obsolescence, and then measured those factors by comparing 
the capacity of Hercules' Bacchus works with the actual utilization 
(production) accomplished at the Bacchus Works. This showed that 
the Bacchus Works was significantly and substantially under-
Tr. 868 
Q: However, you did allocate a certain portion for external 
obsolescence; is that correct? 
A: Yes. I was looking to the future and trying to determine the 
impact of ongoing peace negotiations and things of that nature 
as affecting Hercules' business. In my judgment, 10 percent 
is the allowable amount. It may be overstated. 
Tr. 985 
Q: What empirical evidence is contained in your appraisal to 
justify your assignment of 10 percent external obsolescence to 
the Bacchus Works? 
A: My appraisal does not contain any, either. 
Tr. 1002 
Mr. WILLES: One of the issues I think that is going to be 
most significant in his hearing is going to be the economic 
obsolescence issue. I wanted to understand clearly in my mind 
your selection of 10 -percent and have you give --or give you 
a chance to explain your understanding of where the 10 percent 
came from in this as opposed to five percent or 15 percent or 
some other number in there. Was there some market research 
method of arriving at that percentage number or how did you 
arrive at that 10 percent? 
THE WITNESS: It was my opinion. It was my appraisal judgment 
and opinion that I concluded 10 percent. As I stated earlier, 
I may have, based on the information that I reviewed, 
overstated the external obsolescence. 
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utilized, and that the reason for this under-employment was that 
Hercules had no market for the products these facilities were 
designed to produce, i.e. rocket motors. Thus, the Commission's 
adoption of Mr. Kent's appraised value, as opposed to Hercules', 
was an arbitrary action because Mr. Kent's economic obsolescence 
assignment was wholly arbitrary. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16(4)(h)(iv) (1993) mandates that Hercules be granted relief when 
the Commission's action is "otherwise arbitrary or capricious." 
See also Adams v. Bd. of Rev, of Ind. Comm. . 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Ut. 
App. 1991). 
The County tries to demonstrate that economic obsolescence 
should not be applied to the Bacchus Works because; 
"Hercules '10k' report as of December 31, 1989 
shows a backlog of orders for Hercules 
aerospace of approximately $2.4 billion 
compared with $2.2 billion on December 31, 
1988. Bacchus Works represents 83% of 
Hercules' aerospace assets." County brief, 
p. 22. 
What the County fails to point out is that there is no showing 
this backlog is for production which could be accomplished at the 
Bacchus Works. Hercules has 11 aerospace facilities. The Bacchus 
Works is one of those 11 plants. Mr. Peirson testified that the 
Bacchus Works is devoted to the production of strategic missiles, 
not tactical rocket motors. Tr. p. 99. The strategic missile 
business was declining. Tr. pp. 101-103. The Bacchus Works 
suffered a $343 million loss in 1989, whereas Hercules' aerospace 
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in the aggregate suffered a $243 million loss. Record, Exhibit P-
18c, and Tr. pp. 111-113. This shows that Hercules' Bacchus Works 
was highly unprofitable whereas the other Hercules' aerospace 
facilities were, in fact, generating a net profit. Thus, the 
Bacchus Works continued to lose money whereas other Hercules' 
aerospace facilities were profitably employed. The County's 
attempt to show that no economic obsolescence should apply to the 
Bacchus Works due to a "backlog of orders," is improper, as that 
backlog of orders was applicable to other Hercules facilities but 
not to the Bacchus Works. 
B. Functional Obsolescence. 
Mr. Kent also assigned a 5% functional obsolescence to the 
facilities at NIROP and Plant 1. This 5% factor is another 
completely arbitrary action. The reason Mr. Kent gave for this 5% 
factor was that 5% of the building values were based upon Hercules' 
cost of construction, as opposed to replacement cost arrived at 
through application of the Marshall Valuation Service. Tr. 
pp. 861-62. This has nothing to do with whether or not these 
facilities were functionally obsolescent. 
As shown in Hercules' initial brief, functional obsolescence 
which should be applied to Plant 1 and NIROP can easily be 
demonstrated by comparing the capacity of Plant 1 to Bacchus West. 
Plant 1 has twice the building space as Bacchus West, yet it only 
has production capacity of 300,000 pounds of propellant per month 
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as compared to 2,000,000 pounds per month capacity at Bacchus West, 
i.e. 15% of the capacity of Bacchus West. Moreover, there are 348 
buildings in Plant 1 and 51 buildings in Bacchus West. Obviously, 
Plant 1 is an outdated, technologically obsolete facility suffering 
from significant functional disutility. Mr. Kent's assignment of 
a 5% functional obsolescence to Plant 1 because 5% of the buildings 
of the plant were valued based upon Hercules' cost is completely 
arbitrary, and bears no relationship to reality. This further 
evidences the error of the Commission's decision in adopting 
Mr. Kent's assignment of functional obsolescence as opposed to 
Hercules' proposed value for accumulated depreciation. 
The County also asserts that Mr. Shoup double counted the 
value of Hercules' property by classifying some property as 
personal property. This is simply not true. As is clearly 
demonstrated in the record, Hercules asserted in the hearing that 
one of the major differences between the replacement cost new 
Mr. Kent assigned to Hercules' facilities, and the replacement cost 
new assigned by Mr. Shoup to Hercules' facilities was because 
Mr. Shoup classified a significant portion of Hercules facilities 
as personal property which Mr. Kent included as real property. 
Simply stated this means that if Mr. Shoup were to include in 
his appraisal the personal property he did not initially appraise, 
i.e. all the facilities that Mr. Kent classified as real property, 
then the replacement cost difference is insignificant, less than 
10%. The real difference between the parties in this case is the 
amount of accumulated depreciation assigned, including functional 
and economic obsolescence for Hercules, which should be deducted 
from the property's replacement cost to arrive at fair market 
value. Mr. Shoup and Hercules assigned accumulated depreciation of 
89% for Plant 1, 78% for NIROP, 56% for Plant 3 and 44% for Bacchus 
West. Mr. Kent and the County assigned accumulated depreciation of 
30.8% for Plant 1, 31.8% for NIROP, 17.8% for Plant 3, and 17.7% 
for Bacchus West. Mr. Kent's assignment was arbitrary because he 
could not identify any reasonable basis for his depreciation 
numbers. 
CONCLUSION 
As stated in Hercules' initial brief, the Court should reverse 
the Commission and remand this case for further proceedings 
requiring the Commission to apply the proper burden of proof. 
DATED this /£*&• day of February, 1994. 
<*&-*Lz&6?L 
KtflTH E. TAYLOR 
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER 
RICHARD M. MARSH 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
Bill Thomas Peters 
Special Deputy 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
and Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
310 South Main Street, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^ 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and 
Local Taxation § 788 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Taxation •=» 334. 
59-2-310. Assessment in name of claimant as well as 
owner. 
Real property described on the assessment book need not be described a 
second time, but any person claiming the real property and a desire to be 
assessed for the land may have the person's name inserted with that of the 
person to whom the real property is assessed. 
History: C. 1953, 59-2-310, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 4, § 78. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and C.J.S. — 84 CJ.S. Taxation § 408. 
Local Taxation § 740 et seq. Key Numbers. — Taxation «= 337 et seq. 
59-2-311. Completion and delivery of assessment book — 
Affidavit required — Contents of affidavit. 
Prior to May 22 each year, the assessor shall complete and deliver the 
assessment book to the county auditor. The assessor shall subscribe an affida-
vit in the assessment book substantially as follows: 
I, , the assessor of County, do swear 
that before May 22, 19 , I made diligent inquiry and examination, and 
either personally or by deputy, established the value of all of the property 
within the county subject to assessment by me; that the property has been 
assessed on the assessment book equally and uniformly according to the 
best of my judgment, information, and belief at its fair market value; that 
I have faithfully complied with all the duties imposed on the assessor 
under the revenue laws; and that I have not imposed any unjust or double 
assessments through malice or ill will or otherwise, or allowed anyone to 
escape a just and equal assessment through favor or reward, or otherwise. 
History: C. 1953, 59-2-311, enacted by L. The 1988 amendment by ch. 169, effective 
1987, ch. 4, § 79; 1988, ch. 3, § 98; 1988, ch. April 25, 1988, substituted "May 22" for "May 
169, § 30. 15" near the beginning of the form of the affi-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- davit and made other minor stylistic changes, 
ment by ch. 3, effective February 9, 1988, in This section is set out as reconciled by the 
^S?" *¥£* afBd*v*' substituted "May 22" office of Legislative Research and General 
for May 15 and substituted at its fair mar- Counsel 
ket value" for "at 75% of its fair market value w«*-Jo^^^*;„« rfc~A„«*j™ T moo 
J o x - e n o i n o r J *• i -L Ketrospective Operation. — Laws 1988, 
under Section 59-2-103 for residential property *
 Q c 0™ ., ,^ . ., , , , 
andatlOO%ofitsfairmarketvalue underSec- " h 3 ' § 269 Proy,des that the act has retrospec-
tion 59-2-103 for all other property." t l v e ° P e r a t l o n *> January L 1988. 
80 
59-2-321. Extension of taxes on assessment book. 
The general taxes of each city, town, school, and special taxing district shall 
be extended on the assessment book by the county auditor at the rate certified 
by the governing body of the city, town, school, and special taxing district at 
the time the state and county taxes are extended, and the whole tax shall be 
carried into a column of aggregates, and shall be collected by the county 
treasurer at the time and in the manner provided by law for collecting state 
and county taxes. 
History: R.S. 1898, § 2691; L. 1903, ch. § 44; C. 1953, 59-8-2; renumbered by L. 
132, § 1; C.L. 1907, § 2691; C.L. 1917, § 6105; 1987, ch. 4, § 147. 
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 80-8-2; L. 1982, ch. 71, 
59-2-322. Transmittal of statement to commission. 
The county auditor shall, before June 8 of each year, prepare from the 
assessment book of that year a statement showing in separate columns: 
(1) the total value of all property; 
(2) the value of real estate, including patented mining claims, stated 
separately; 
(3) the value of the improvements; 
(4) the value of personal property exclusive of money; and 
(5) the number of acres of land and the number of patented mining 
claims, stated separately. 
As soon as the statement is prepared the county auditor shall transmit the 
statement by mail to the commission. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 2600, 71, § 45; C. 1953, 59-8-3; renumbered by L. 
2601; C.L. 1917, §§ 6000,6001; R.S. 1933 & C. 1987, ch. 4, § 148; 1987, ch. 148, § 2. 
1943, 80-8-3; L. 1981, ch. 241, § 9; 1982, ch. 
59-2-323. Changes ordered by commission. 
(1) The commission shall,, before June 17 or within ten days after the 
county auditors of the state have filed their report with the commission as 
provided for under Section 59-2-322, each year transmit to the county auditor 
a statement of the changes made by it in the assessment book of the county, as 
provided under Section 59-1-210. 
(2) As soon as the county auditor receives from the commission a statement 
of the changes made by it in the assessment book of the county, or of any 
assessment contained therein, the auditor shall make the corresponding 
changes in the assessment book, by entering the same in a column provided 
with the proper heading in the assessment book, counting any fractional sum 
when more than 50 cents as one dollar and omitting it when less than 50 
cents, so that the value of any separate assessment shall contain no fractions 
of a dollar; but shall in all cases disregard any action of the county board of 
equalization or commission which is prohibited by law. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2602; § 46; C. 1953, 59-8-4; renumbered by L. 
C.L. 1917, § 6002; R.S. 1933, 80-8-4; L. 1941, 1987, ch. 4, § 149; 1987, ch. 148, § 3. 
ch. 82, § 1; C. 1943, 80-8-4; L. 1982, ch. 71, 
84 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Partial payment of tax. on delinquent date, treasurer must proceed, as 
While no taxpayer may compel county trea- provided by law, to sell property for such 
surer to accept less than the whole tax levied unpaid tax, and penalty must be computed 
against a separate parcel of property, except as upon amount of tax remaining unpaid and de-
provided by this section, yet county treasurer linquent, and interest after sale must be corn-
may in his discretion accept part payment and puted upon amount for which property was 
credit same upon tax assessed and, when that sold. State ex rel. State Tax ComnYn v. Evans, 
is done, if any part of the tax remains unpaid 79 Utah 370, 6 P.2d 161, 84 A.L.R. 766 (1932). 
59-2-1331. Date tax is delinquent — Penalty — Interest — 
Payments. 
(1) All taxes, unless otherwise specifically provided for under Section 
59-2-1332, or other law, unpaid or postmarked after November 30 of each year 
following the date of levy, are delinquent, and the county treasurer shall close 
the treasurer's office for the posting of current year tax payments until a 
delinquent list has been prepared. 
(2) All delinquent taxes are subject to a penalty of 2% of the amount of the 
taxes or $10, whichever is greater. Unless the delinquent taxes, together with 
the penalty, are paid before January 16, the amount of taxes and penalty shall 
bear interest on a per annum basis from January 1 following the delinquency 
date. This interest rate is 600 basis points (6%) above the "Federal Discount 
Rate" that exists on January 1 following the date of delinquency. 
(3) If the delinquency exceeds one year, the amount of taxes and penalty for 
that year and all succeeding years shall bear interest until settled in full 
through redemption or final tax sale. The interest rate to be applied shall be 
calculated for each year as established under Subsection (2) and shall apply on 
each individual year's delinquency until paid. 
(4) The county treasurer may accept and credit on account against taxes 
becoming due during the current year, at any time before or after the levies 
are made, but not subsequent to the date of delinquency, either: 
(a) payments in amounts of not less than $10; or 
(b) the full amount of the unpaid tax. 
History: C. 1953, 59-2-1331, enacted by L. ing of current year tax payments" for "receipt 
1988, ch. 3, § 188; 1991, ch. 40, § 1. of taxes" in Subsection (1); in Subsection (2), 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1988, substituted "or $10 whichever is greater" for 
ch. 3, § 188 repeals former § 59-2-1331, as "with a minimum penalty of $10" in the first 
amended by L. 1987, ch. 4, § 209, relating to sentence and substituted "January 16" for 
sale of undivided interests in land, and enacts "January 15" in the second sentence; and made 
the present section, effective February 9, 1988. changes in punctuation in Subsection (4). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1988, 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "or ch. 3, § 269 provides that the act has retrospec-
postmarked after" for "at noon on" and "post- tive operation to January 1, 1988. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
N 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d State and C.J.S. — 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 617. 
Local Taxation §§ 842, 856 to 865. Key Numbers. — Taxation *=» 526 et seq. 
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(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings, 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990, ment, effective April 23,1990, added the excep-
ch. 132, § 1. tion at the end of Subsection (l)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re 
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert. 
Final agency action. denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
Function of district court. The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily 
Right to judicial proceeding. delegated to the district court is to review in-
Cited, formal agency adjudicative proceedings. State 
Final agency action. ]$"*»'• 7 9 4 R 2 d 4 9 6 ( U t a h C t A p p " 
Industrial Commission's determination of 
wrongful discharge was not final, and so not Right to judicial proceeding. 
reviewable under this section, because the District court erred in declining a de novo 
commission and the parties had not resolved review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reci-
the issue of reimbursement for lost wages and procity, where there had been no proceeding on 
benefits as required by § 34-28-19(2). Parkdale his application that was sufficiently judicial in 
Care Ctr. v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. nature, and he had not yet had the licensing 
App. 1992). agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hear-
_
 r ing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Pro-
Function of .detect court fessional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. 
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
 A i g g i ) 
agency decisions through formal adjudicative 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 
the district court will no longer function as in- 233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah 
termediate appellate court except to review in- State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Ct. 
formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu- App. 1993). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
« (i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-16, enacted by L. ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610. 
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Agency action. 
Applicability of section. 
Arbitrary action. 
Conflicting evidence. 
Factual findings. 
Final order. 
Function of district court. 
Jurisdictional hearing by board. 
Prior practice. 
Review. 
Standard of review. 
—Interpretation of statutory term. 
—Questions of law. 
Substantial evidence test. 
Substantial prejudice. 
Whole record test. 
Cited. 
Agency action. 
Whether the Industrial Commission acted 
contrary to its own rule is governed by Subsec-
tion (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. Indus-
trial Comrn'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Applicability of section. 
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not 
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of 
deference an appellate court grants to an 
agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief 
should not be granted when, although the 
agency committed error, the error was harm-
less. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comrn'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Arbitrary action. 
Industrial commission's denial of occupa-
tional disease disability benefits based upon a 
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of 
causation failed to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions 
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and there-
fore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v. 
Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
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Conflicting evidence. 
In undertaking a review, the appellate court 
will not substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though the 
court might have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before it for de novo review. 
It is the province of the board, not appellate 
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and 
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn 
from the same evidence, it is for the board to 
draw the inferences. Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Appellate court refers to the assessment by 
the Board of Review of the Utah Industrial 
Commission on conflicting evidence. Albert-
sons, Inc. v. Department of Emp. Sec., 854 P.2d 
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Factual findings. 
Under Subsection (4)(d), the appellate court 
will not disturb the board's application of its 
factual findings to the law unless its determi-
nation exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. 
Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Nelson v. Dep't of Emp. Sec., 801 P.2d 
158 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Final order. 
Administrative law judge's denial of motions 
to dismiss petitions of the Division of Occupa-
tional and Professional Licensing allowed the 
proceeding to continue in the agency and was 
not a final order for purposes of judicial review. 
Barney v. Division of Occupational and Profes-
sional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
Nonfinal agency orders do not divest the 
agency of jurisdiction. Maverik Country 
Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 221 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Function of district court 
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency 
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed-
ings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme 
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis-
trict court will no longer function as intermedi-
ate appellate court except to review informal 
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to 
§ 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 
(Utah 1989). 
Jurisdictional hearing by board. 
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over 
appeal from jurisdictional hearing conducted 
by a hearing officer appointed by the Career 
Service Review Board since the hearing was a 
formal adjudicative proceeding. Lopez v. Ca-
reer Serv. Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Prior practice. 
Ten agency decisions in which pharmacists 
committed equal or allegedly more significant 
violations of the law, but received substan-
tially lighter penalties than petitioner re-
ceived, raised a question about the consistency 
of his penalty with prior agency practice. 
Pickett v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 218 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 51 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Review. 
Because POST (Division of Peace Officer 
Standards and Training) did not conduct any 
formal proceedings, and petitioner's filing of a 
"complaint" with POST about an officer did not 
require it to do so, the appellate court did not 
have jurisdiction to review POSTs decision not 
to pursue decertification of POST officer. Niel-
son v. Division of Peace Officer Stds. & Train-
ing, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Standard of review. 
Under Subsection (4)(d), it is appropriate for 
a court to review an agency's interpretation of 
its statutorily granted powers and authority as 
a question of law, with no deference to the 
agency's view of the law. The correction-of-
error standard will be applied to such an issue 
and the agency's statutory interpretation will 
be upheld only if it is concluded to be not erro-
neous. Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d 
573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Under Subsection (4)(d), a court may grant 
relief based upon an agency's erroneous inter-
pretation of law. This incorporates the correc-
tion-of-error standard previously applied by 
the Utah courts in cases involving agency in-
terpretations of law. Savage Indus., Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 
1991). 
The legislature in enacting Subsection (4) in-
tended that the same standard used for deter-
mining the harmfulness of error in appeals 
from judicial proceedings should apply to re-
views of agency actions. Under this standard, 
an error will be harmless if it is sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome 
of the proceedings. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-
error standard is used in reviewing an agency's 
interpretation or application of a statutory 
term. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Mor-Flo 
Indus., Inc. v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 
516 (Utah 1992). 
An agency's statutory construction should 
only be given deference when there is a grant 
of discretion to the agency concerning the lan-
guage in question, either expressly made in the 
statute or implied from the statutory language. 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
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814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Uintah Oil Ass'n v. 
County Bd. of Equalization, 853 P.2d 894 
(Utah 1993). 
Constitutional questions are characterized 
as questions of law, and under Subsection 
(4)(d), agency determinations of general law — 
which include interpretations of the state and 
federal constitutions — are to be reviewed un-
der a correction-of-error standard, giving no 
deference to the agency's decision. Questar 
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 817 
P.2d 316 (Utah 1991). 
Under Subsection (4)(a), the Court of Ap-
peals reviews the constitutionality of the stat-
ute upon which an agency's action is based 
without deference, as a conclusion of law. 
Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Because courts should uphold agency rules if 
they are reasonable and rational, courts should 
also uphold reasonable and rational departures 
from those rules by the agency absent a show-
ing that the departure violated some other 
right. Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div., 842 
P.2d 876 (Utah 1992). 
Deference is given to an agency's statutory 
construction only when there is a grant of dis-
cretion to the agency concerning the language 
in question, either expressly made in the stat-
ute or implied from the statutory language. 
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-
error standard is used in reviewing an agency's 
interpretation or application of a statutory 
term. Horton v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 
842 P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Since § 35-4-5(b)(l) provides that a claimant 
is ineligible for unemployment benefits if the 
individual is "discharged for just cause . . . if 
so found by the commission," the appellate 
court reviews the action of the Board of Review 
of the Utah Industrial Commission under Sub-
section (4)(h)(i) of this section for reasonable-
ness. Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Emp. 
Sec., 854 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—Interpretation of statutory term. 
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-
error standard is used in reviewing an agency's 
interpretation or application of a statutory 
term such as "injuriously exposed to the haz-
ards of such disease" in § 35-2-105. However, 
when the legislature either expressly or im-
plicitly grants the agency discretion to inter-
pret or apply a statutory term, a court will re-
view the agency's interpretation or application 
under a reasonableness standard. Luckau v. 
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 840 P.2d 
811 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
—Questions of law. 
Intermediate deference should be granted to 
an agency's interpretation or application of 
specific laws when the legislature has explic-
itly or implicitly delegated discretion to the 
agency to interpret or apply that law. If there 
is no explicit delegation of discretion, and the 
issues are questions of constitutional law and 
statutory construction on which the commis-
sion's experience and expertise will be of no 
real assistance, the standard of intermediate 
deference should not be applied. Zissi v. State 
Tax Comm'r, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992). 
Substantial evidence test 
In applying the "substantial evidence test," 
the appellate court reviews the "whole record" 
before the court, and this review is distinguish-
able from both a de novo review and the "any 
competent evidence" standard of review. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The "substantial evidence test" of Subsection 
(4)(g) grants appellate courts greater latitude 
in reviewing the record than was previously 
granted under the Utah Employment Security 
Act's "any evidence of substance test." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
"Substantial evidence" is more than a mere 
"scintilla" of evidence, though something less 
than the weight of the evidence. It is such rele-
vant evidence as a reasonable mind might ac-
cept as adequate to support a conclusion. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and 
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support a con-
clusion. First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). 
The party challenging the findings must 
marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the supporting 
facts, the agency's findings are not supported 
by substantial evidence. First Nat'l Bank v. 
County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 
(Utah 1990); Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 
v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Substantial prejudice. 
Agency decision revoking social worker's li-
cense was reversed and his case was remanded 
for a new hearing, because the failure to afford 
him an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him resulted in "substantial 
prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
The "substantial prejudice" phrase in Sub-
section (4) relates to the damage or harm suf-
fered by the person seeking review and was 
written to ensure that a court will not issue 
advisory opinions reviewing agency action 
when no true controversy has resulted from 
that action. The phrase does not relate to the 
degree of deference a court must give an 
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agency decision. Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comrn'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). 
Whole record test 
The "whole record test" necessarily requires 
that a party challenging the board's findings of 
fact must marshall all of the evidence support-
ing the findings and show that despite the sup-
porting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence. Grace Drill-
ing Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
Under the "whole record test," a court must 
consider not only the evidence supporting the 
board's factual findings, but also the evidence 
that fairly detracts from the weight of the 
board's evidence. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Cited in Law Offices of David Paul White & 
Assocs. v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 20 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989); Zimmerman v. Industrial 
Comrn'n, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comrn'n, 800 P.2d 330 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Fred Meyer v. Industrial 
Comrn'n, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 
P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); In re SAM Oil, 
Inc., 817 P.2d 299 (Utah 1991); Salt Lake 
County ex rel. County Bd. of Equalization v. 
State Tax Comrn'n, 819 P.2d 776 (Utah 1991); 
Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah 
1991); Johnson-Bowles Co. v. Department of 
Commerce, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 
448 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Southern Utah Wil-
derness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992); Ferro v. 
Utah Dep't of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992); MCI Telecommunications Corp. 
v. Public Serv. Comrn'n, 840 P.2d 765 (Utah 
1992); Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); Giesbrecht v. Board of 
Review, 828 P.2d 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992); Stewart v. Board of Review, 
831 P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Holland v. 
State Office of Educ, 834 P.2d 596 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Anderson v. Public Serv. Comrn'n, 
839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992); Gibson v. Depart-
ment of Emp. Sec., 840 P.2d 780 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); LaSal Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl. 
Quality, 843 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
King v. Industrial Comrn'n, 850 P.2d 1281 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Board of Equalization v. 
Sinclair Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 892 (Utah 1993); 
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. 
v. Tax Comrn'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct. 
App. 1993); Thorup Bros. Constr. v. Auditing 
Div. of Utah State Tax Comrn'n, 221 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 39 (1993). 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 273. 
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